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Abstract 
The organizational characteristics of production in the European automotive industry 
have favoured a high degree of fragmentation and productive mobility. This article 
analyses the differing national positions of automotive producing countries and their 
export patterns – particularly their export reorientation to extra-European Union (EU) 
markets following the collapse of regional demand in the European automotive industry. 
Based on the methodologies of Mahutga and Piana our position analysis arrives at two 
main conclusions: i) the countries best positioned in the European regional automotive 
production network are precisely those that have experienced a greater increase in extra-
EU exports, thus reducing their dependence on regional European demand; ii) the increase 
in extra-EU exports (mainly of final goods) is linked to increased regional fragmentation 
of production in the automotive industry. We conclude that the governance of this 
fragmentation process is a key determinant of extra-EU export competitiveness.  
Keywords: production network; automotive industry; export pattern; Europe; 
internationalization of production 
JEL: L62, F15 
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Introduction 
Various studies have analysed the automotive industry and its high production 
fragmentation which is organized around increasingly globalized regional production 
areas such as the European Union (Dicken, 2003; Domanski and Lung, 2009; Frigant, 
and Layan, 2009; Jürgens and Krzywdzinsky, 2009; Frigant and Zumpe, 2014). Following 
this production fragmentation process the underlying global production network 
governance structures of leading companies in the industry (which determine what, 
where, and how goods will be produced) have created differentiated national producer 
country positions within these networks (Gereffi and Korzeniewics, 1994; Hess, 2008, 
Gibbon et al. 2008). At the same time, various articles have linked the relative power and 
position of actors within the production network to the potential for industrial upgrading, 
as well as to processes of value generation and capture. Much of this work has focused 
on new producers in Eastern Europe (Humphrey and Memedonic, 2003; Coe et al., 2004: 
Pavlinek et al., 2009; Fortwengel, 2011). Yet few studies have linked national producer 
country positions within the network (and the underlying patterns of fragmentation and 
specialization) to the competitiveness of different national industries, whether intra- or 
extra-European Union (EU). In the process of post-crisis restructuring, this turns out to 
be a central issue since the recovery of domestic industries has been shown to depend 
largely on the dynamism of the trading partners of these industries (European 
Commission, 2010). 
 
Our article contributes to the European automotive literature and to global production 
network research in three ways. First, it demonstrates the existence of distinct positions 
within the European automotive industry, highlighting German control and consolidation 
through growing regional fragmentation of production. Second, the article contributes to 
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the analysis of power and position within production networks by linking them to the 
competitiveness of national industries (and in particular, to the potential reorientation 
towards extra-EU markets). The results of our analysis reveal a close relationship between 
the network position of each country and the degree of autonomy from regional demand. 
Third, the increasing globalization of regional production networks cited by some authors 
(see e.g., Los et al., 2015) appears rather uneven when the analysis is focused on the 
European automotive industry. 
 
Our choice of the automotive industry1 is justified on two main counts. First, the industry 
is of historical importance to the EU economy in terms of production, employment, and 
trade. Moreover, it has important linkages with other sectors of the economy. On average, 
this sector represents around 4% of the gross domestic product of the EU and 7% of 
employment, sustaining approximately three million direct jobs and nine million indirect 
jobs. The sector also represents the largest private investor in research and development 
in the EU.2 Moreover, the EU is one of the leading automotive producers and has a share 
of more than 20% of global automotive production. At a time when world trade is on the 
rise, this openness grants a growing share of world production to emerging economies. 
This includes the rise of China which is now a leading automotive manufacturer. 
Nonetheless, the success of Chinese production in this sector should be regarded with 
certain caution, because production remains oriented toward satisfying the domestic 
market. In any case, China´s share in the world market in 2012 stood at 4.9%. Although 
                                                     
1 Code 87 of the Harmonized System, "Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and 
parts and accessories thereof".  
2 See https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/automotive_en 
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South Korea remains a significant automotive producing county (with 6.6% of the world 
market in 2012), it still lags behind the traditional industry leaders, the United States 
(10%) and Japan (12%). 
Second, the organizational characteristics of production have favoured a high degree of 
fragmentation and productive mobility within the EU, as well as numerous relocation 
processes over the past two decades, making this industry an interesting case for 
production network analysis (Dicken, 2003; Coe et al., 2004). In order to assess the 
degree of European automotive industry fragmentation and regionalization, it is essential 
to analyse the significance of intra-EU trade. In terms of exports, eight of the twenty eight 
European partners accounted for more than 80% of intra EU trade in 2015. When 
compared to the year 2000 Germany has maintained its leadership role but with a 
reduction in its share of European automotive production. A similar trend can be observed 
in relation to other traditional automotive producing countries (France, Spain, Italy, and 
the UK), while the share of Eastern European economies (Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Hungary) has increased. Only Germany and the United Kingdom have a 
higher share of extra-EU automotive exports over intra-EU. The regionalization of the 
sector is even more evident in terms of imports as imports of EU origin are above 80% in 
twenty four of the twenty eight partners. It is interesting to highlight that Germany has 
been gradually increasing imports from Eastern Europe as a result of the relocation of 
production plants during the past two decades. As we will argue later in the article, this 
strengthens German hegemony in this sector. 
 
However, changes have occurred in the production and trade geography of the automotive 
sector in the last ten to fifteen years which have increased the importance of extra-regional 
markets. Two distinct but interconnected trends may explain this phenomenon. First, the 
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growing importance of extra-EU markets has been fuelled by the global economic crisis 
and by a sharp drop in European demand. In these circumstances, the export reorientation 
of European production towards other regions has been seen as a potential solution and 
as an engine of a new growth phase driven by extra-EU demand. Second, emerging 
producer countries have become more competitive, leading to a surge in imports of 
automotive parts and components from countries outside of the EU. While this signals 
the rise of production fragmentation in the automotive industry on a global basis, the 
fragmentation process takes on particular regional features in the European automotive 
industry.3 
 
In this article, we examine whether this analysis can be applied to all European 
automotive economies due to their varied linkages and positions in the regional European 
production network. In order to answer this question we assume that the position of each 
national industry within the production network strongly influences its potential for 
reorientation towards markets outside the EU.  In this article, we therefore apply network 
position analysis (see section two) to the European automotive sector with a view to 
assessing the post-crisis re-shaping of exports from the sector.  
 
The structure of our article is as follows. In section two, we define ‘position’ and explain 
the methodology used for our study. In section three, we analyse the different positions 
                                                     
3 Of the 12 major European car producers, imports from the EU27 exceed 85% of total imports 
in the sector. According to Los et al. (2015: 72), in the case of Germany, the main producer, the 
intra-EU aggregate value in car production remains very high, at 84.6 % in 2008 (although it was 
higher in 1995, at 92.1%).  
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of the main European producer countries, highlighting changes that have occurred in their 
position in the period between 1999 and 2014. Section four goes onto explain basic trends 
in export patterns in the European automotive sector combining technological 
specialization with trade geography analysis. This allows us to assess how widespread 
the export reorientation has been of the main producer countries and relate this with their 
network positions in the European automotive industry. Finally, the conclusion outlines 
our main findings.  
 
Background literature 
For more than three decades different authors have discussed the significance of 
international production fragmentation. These approaches include: i) the global 
commodity chains (GCC) approach, which later evolved into the very similar ii) global 
value chains (GVC) approach; and iii) the global production networks (GPN) approach.4 
The authors of the first two approaches (GCC and GVC analysis) developed their studies 
of global commodity and value chains with an emphasis on understanding chain 
dynamism as a whole, but they were likewise interested in how these chains touched down 
in various national economies. These countries were often considered on an individual 
basis in terms of their linkages into global value chains, and how they could change the 
position of their export-oriented firms within these chains.  
 
                                                     
4 Another approach, called Commodity Chain (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977), is considered a 
pioneer in the analysis of productive internationalization and its hierarchical nature. Nevertheless, 
the amplitude of the unit of analysis adopted by that approach (the world economy) has hampered 
its operability for the study of specific industries and intra-chain relationships. 
 
 
7 
In line with the work of Bair (2005, 2008) we believe that the GPN approach 
complements rather than replaces GVC analysis (Bair, 2005). Nonetheless, as the GPN 
literature notes, there is a significant difference between the terms ‘network’ and ‘chain’, 
and in the use of the terms ‘production’ and ‘commodity’ (Henderson et al., 2002:444). 
GPN scholars prefer the ‘network’ over the ‘chain’ metaphor in order to avoid an 
exclusive focus on the vertical analysis of interfirm relations in the value chain. Instead 
GPN scholars favour an approach that also integrates the horizontal and diagonal aspects 
of production network analysis. For these authors, the vertical structure underlying the 
chain analysis is obsolete, as reflected in the power that some suppliers have managed to 
achieve in certain chains. The concept of ‘production’ is preferred over ‘commodity’ to 
emphasize the socially embedded nature of the production process. From this may follow 
what Bair (2005) has considered the hallmark of this approach: GPN scholars pay greater 
attention to specific political, institutional, and territorial determinants of global 
production networks. Therefore, in the GPN literature, the concept of ‘embeddedness’ is 
important in relation to ‘local’ determinants of economic processes.  
 
The differences in the CCC, GVC, and GPN approaches outlined above are reflected in 
the concept and the precise methodology required for position analysis. It is necessary to 
begin by emphasizing that various approaches consider that the network position of firms 
is directly related to their power within the network. In the words of Henderson et al. 
(2002: 450) the power of a firm can be defined as “the capacity to influence decisions and 
resources allocations – vis-à-vis other firms in the network– decisively and consistently 
in its own interest”. Thus, power is a result of firm specialization, but it subsequently 
enables firms to make particular decisions that can reinforce or transform their 
specialization, thereby also influencing the specialization of other firms. Thus, 
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specialization in activities with higher barriers to entry have allowed firms to occupy 
power positions within the network.  
The GCC and GVC approaches have been useful in identifying structures of value chain 
governance (i.e. interfirm power relations). In fact, this rather narrow analytical focus in 
the GCC and GVC literatures has proved to be important in developing an empirical 
position analysis (see below). Nevertheless, in our view, GPN analysis also contains key 
elements for analysing the concept of power in GPNs and its implications for the 
dynamics of the production network:  
i) The asymmetrical, hierarchical power relations are compatible with the 
dynamic nature of the network (Coe et al., 2008:276). Therefore, position 
analysis should be made from a dynamic perspective to be able to understand 
changes in the network. Our research aims to develop this type of analysis for 
the European automotive industry by focusing on a particular aspect: its 
geographical export pattern and its position/relationship vis-à-vis the intra-EU 
network. As suggested by Coe et al. (2004: 469), we assume that “[t]he 
fortunes of regions [or countries] are shaped not only by what is going on 
within them, but also through wider sets of relations of control and 
dependency, of competition and markets”. 
ii) Power relationships within a production network are complex and do not 
respond to a single governance structure. The GPN approach aims to 
overcome the linearity associated with value chain analysis by clarifying the 
distinction between producer- and buyer-driven production and by 
recognizing the possibility of the coexistence of both structures in the same 
sector (Henderson et al., 2002). This is particularly important in sectors where 
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different products are grouped under a single commercial or productive 
category, as is the case with the automotive sector.  
iii) These authors distinguish between "corporate power", "institutional power" 
and "collective power" exercised by actors within the network. Despite the 
centrality occupied by the firm in GPN analysis, this approach emphasizes the 
importance of non-firm agents and the regulatory structures that host them. 
Economic processes must be understood as complex multi-vertical and 
horizontal linkages. In this sense, they do not constitute mere nodes of a 
network as they are bounded by legal frameworks and regulatory structures 
while they impact upon the spaces where are established. These mutual 
linkages constantly reconfigure the space and relationships between nodes 
(Hardy et al., 2011). However, the GPN approach will not be explicitly 
reflected in our position indicator analysis as our unit of analysis is national 
economies. It is crucial to keep this in mind in relation to assessing the 
importance of non-firm actors in the various national positions within global 
production networks. 
As we have pointed out, our unit of analysis is the different economies participating in 
the network of automotive production in the EU. Strictly speaking, in the GCC, GVC, 
and GPN approaches, the unit of analysis is firms (not countries), and power relations 
between firms in transnational industries. However, the country-level perspective that we 
adopt in this article is more reflected in world systems analysis which intends to analyse 
the consequences of a specific country’s external insertion into global value chains. 
Although there is a gap between the two levels of analysis, they are causally interrelated. 
It is possible to assign the overall domestic industry a position within the European 
automotive network, despite each domestic industry being comprised of firms with 
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various levels of power. In fact, we agree with Mahutga (2013) on the need to use national 
economies as the unit of analysis in order to enable comparisons between countries (not 
only between firms) and to connect with various issues of national economic 
performance. This is precisely the aim of our work, as we seek to associate network 
position with the ability of extra-EU export reorientation to serve as an engine for 
production recovery following the outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
As mentioned above, power in GPN analysis is partly related to the ability of actors to 
decide how goods will be produced and by whom in GPNs. In our view, this power is not 
only important in determining inter-firm power relations but also inter-country trade 
relations. This idea provides support for methodologies that have sought to analyse such 
trade relations through position indicators. These indicators take an analysis of trade 
shares as their starting point, but they do so assuming certain premises from the global 
commodity and value chain literatures such as the differentiation of final and intermediate 
goods. Both allow us to position each country within the European automotive network.5 
 
 
Methodology for network position analysis  
                                                     
5 Although not addressed in this paper, a position analysis can be developed based on the 
dynamics of technological change. While it is true that a wide range of firms participate in this 
dynamic, not all have the ability to lead and control such a process. In short, in terms of 
technology, it is also to speak of a hierarchical structure within the automotive sector clearly 
appreciating differences between producers and suppliers of parts and components (Dicken, 
2003). 
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We identify two basic methodologies for measuring network position using trade flows. 
The first is called Positional Power Measurement and is based on the distinction between 
producer-driven and buyer-driven chains (Mahutga, 2013). The second is called Network 
Mapping. This is based on the pattern approach to world trade structures (Piana, 2006) 
which considers power as held jointly by both buyers and suppliers.  
These two methodologies are built for a similar purpose, and they share certain main 
characteristics. Both emerge from the same framework: the existence of identifiable 
hierarchical structures, where the role of each country arises from its relationships with 
all others. Further, while emphasizing that links are forged between enterprises from a 
chain or network perspective, both methodologies consider countries as the main unit of 
analysis. In this way, a country’s trade is an aggregate of the external exchanges of those 
enterprises located within it, meaning that it also reflects the position of the productive 
structure they collectively form. Positional power measurement is based on an indicator 
which quantifies and aggregates the relative importance of one country over others 
individually, thus yielding a specific measure of that country’s position. Network mapping 
illustrates the specific exchange network showing all the bilateral trade relations of a 
country which are classified by their relative importance. Hence, positional power 
measurement provides a single orderable value for each country, indicative of its relative 
position in the network while network mapping shows that position according to specific 
bilateral relations, their total number, and their relative importance. When combined these 
two methodologies provide a clear picture of the position of each country within the 
network.  
 
Below we outline the special characteristics of each methodology with a view to 
highlighting their similarities and differences. 
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i) Positional power measurement defines the position indicator assuming control 
mechanisms that have been previously defined by the GCC approach (Gereffi, 1994) for 
two different types of governance structures: producer-driven and buyer-driven chains. 
Despite this having been later questioned and revised by Gereffi et al., 2005, due to the 
simplicity of classifying all existing governance structures into only two types, it remains 
useful for the general characterization of a given sector and its regional articulation. In 
any case, as we shall see, some of its critics have been considered in our analysis of 
positions in the European automotive network, taking into account the simultaneous 
existence of the two different governance structures within the network (producer-driven 
for final goods and buyer-driven for parts and components). 
 
In the distinction made between governance structures guided by producers or by buyers, 
the leadership exercised by top firms differs both in the type of control and the direction 
in which it is exercised. In buyer-driven chains, this is exercised mainly backward, 
towards suppliers, depending on the ability of large buyers to use their bargaining power 
to induce competition among potential suppliers6 (Gereffi, 1994; Heintz, 2006; Mahutga, 
2013). In this case, the companies that capture most of the value are the buyers or 
distributors. 
In the automotive sector, however, where assemblers are transnational companies leading 
the network, power relations follow the producer-driven distinction described by Gereffi 
(1994).7 Coordination and technology transfer mechanisms between assemblers and 
                                                     
6 This type of chain has been traditionally associated with the textile sector. 
7 In the automotive production network there are mainly two types of companies: the "producers" 
or assemblers (TCNs leading the network, as owners of the brand and responsible for design), and 
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suppliers depend on the status of the latter (Sturgeon et al., 2008, Coe et al., 2008) where 
it is the producer or assembler companies that capture more value. Consequently, 
exporting to more countries which in turn comes to depend on a country’s own imports is 
a sign of better position and greater control of the network. Mahutga (2013) proposes two 
indicators for measuring the position in both types of governance structures: 8 
 
Producer-driven9:  this measures the relative quantity of exports from a reporting 
country over imports from its trade partners. The higher the value, the greater the 
importance of the reporting country as exporter (producer) over its partners. 
 
Buyer-driven:  this measures the relative quantity of exports from each partner 
over the imports coming into the reporting economy. The higher the value, the greater the 
volume of imports to the reporting country, thus weighing more heavily on the export 
structures of the trade partners. 
                                                     
the suppliers that produce parts and that sometimes perform certain assembly of same (Coe et al., 
2008; Sturgeon, et al., 2008; Estrada et al., 1997). The division between assemblers and suppliers 
includes some simplification of the network’s organization, as inside suppliers are in fact 
comprised of different categories determined by the level of technological sophistication, the 
power within the network, or the type of labour relations (Banyuls and Lorente, 2010). 
8  Other authors (Ferrarini, 2011) make national aggregations from the weighting of these same 
indicators with the share of each industry on total flows in a country. In our case, as we focus on 
a single sector, we have chosen the indicators of Mahutga (2013). 
9 See Annex for technical details. 
 14 
Although the literature associates the automotive industry with a producer-driven 
governance structure, where the power lies with the final producer, these companies 
consume intermediate inputs that are often not produced in the same country where they 
are installed. As we will see, there are also differences in specialization patterns if we 
distinguish final goods from parts and components. On the basis of this distinction it is 
possible to appreciate how different positions within the network are reflected both in the 
power of a producer of final goods and through the power of a buyer in intermediate 
goods as exerted by those same producers, the major automobile firms. The globalization 
of parts and components production and the increased competition among suppliers of 
these inputs mean that the overall sector cannot be characterized as embodying a single 
governance structure. Automotive producers also exert purchasing power over suppliers 
that can be measured through the buyer-driven indicator. The fundamental difference 
from typical buyer-driven chains is that parts and components are intermediate inputs 
which can help improve the export competitiveness of final goods (Timmer et al. 2013). 
In this regard, a better position in the buyer-driven chain of parts and components 
promotes a better export position in final goods. 
 
Therefore, we consider it appropriate to calculate a Positional Power indicator, 
disaggregating exchanges of final goods and component parts.10 For the first case, we 
apply the producer-driven indicator (Mahutga, 2013), measuring the weight of exports of 
                                                     
10 This disaggregation has been made from the data of HS6 commercial classification by 
Eurostat. Under Chapter 87, final goods are considered to be those between codes 870110 and 
870590, inclusive, while parts and components are considered those between codes 870600 and 
870899. 
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final goods on import structures of the countries that receive them. For the second case, 
we apply the buyer-driven indicator measuring the share of imports of parts and 
components on the final exports of each country. Ultimately, what we measure with this 
method is the relative quantity of the exports of final goods from one country over the 
imports of the rest; or on the other hand, the relative quantity of imports of parts and 
components of one country over the exports of the rest. This allows us to obtain an 
aggregate measure of the position of a country within the regional network. 
 
ii) Network mapping methodology considers that it is essential to know the number of 
relations between countries, jointly considering the “power to buy” along with the “power 
to sell” in order to understand the hierarchy of trade. The presence of trade relations is 
based on the existence of (or lack of) relations of dominance or dependence. In order to 
measure the degree and direction of the trade hierarchy Piana (2006) considers bilateral 
trade relations between pairs of countries. In order to perform a similar measurement we 
consider the bilateral exports and imports of each country vis-à-vis other countries in the 
automotive sector. These trade relationships are ordered so that if one country is among 
the five largest importers or exporters in relation to another, that country is considered to 
be relevant to their trade structure. Having identified the major trading partners in the 
European automotive sector, trade relations in the automotive industry between country 
A and country B are then described based on four criteria: 
1. "For B, A is an important destination for exports"; 
2. "For B, A is a relevant origin of imports"; 
3. "For A, B is an important destination for exports"; 
4. "For A, B is a relevant origin of imports". 
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In this way, sixteen possible combinations11 arise (see table A1, Annex), allowing us to 
identify what kinds of trade occurs among which countries by contextualizing sector-level 
data. A given country can have a share in the European market similar to another’s, but 
may engage in trade relationships with fewer countries at the same time. 
To summarize the two methodologies are complementary since they are focused on the 
analysis of positions within a network, considering the relative importance of some 
countries over others in terms of trade flows (exports and imports). The network mapping 
approach aims to provide a more complete picture of the overall network by showing and 
classifying bilateral trade relations. In contrast, the positional power approach provides a 
unique value that can used to rank countries’ positions in the network.  In this positional 
indicator, we differentiate between final goods and parts and components according to 
the criteria outlined above. 
 
Findings  
Background of the European automotive industry 
The EU is among the world's biggest automotive producers, and the sector represents the 
largest private investor in research and development in the automotive sector12 (ACEA, 
2013). In 2014, more than 22% of global automotive production occurred in Europe, a 
                                                     
11  These are independent proposals, because each may be true or false independent of the 
value of the other. For each pair of countries, we build a binary variable that takes the value 1 if 
the proposition is true, and 0 otherwise. 
12 As an example, in 2012, six of the 20 enterprises with the highest R+D investment in the world 
(three of them European) belonged to the automotive sector, the second most important sector in 
R+D investment behind the pharmaceutical industry (CCOO, 2015). 
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decrease of seven points from 2007 due to the financial crisis and the enormous growth 
in Asia where half of world production and the largest markets are now located. However, 
this change in the geographical distribution of automotive production has been influenced 
by the evolution of regional demand, and it does not imply a disintegration of European 
productive relations. 
 
The organizational characteristics of the sector and its historical peculiarities have 
confined productive processes in the European Union to regional neighbours given the 
importance of proximity in respect to end-markets. This has also happened because of the 
existence of competitive ‘glue’ at different supply levels. At the same time, productive 
changes in recent decades have favoured a high degree of fragmentation and productive 
mobility combined with the increasing significance of extra-regional trade in the 
automotive industry. This has been observed in both the provision of inputs and the 
destination of end goods, although an articulated productive core remains in place around 
a primarily regional production chain in which each national industry takes up different 
positions. According to Eurostat, in 2015, fifteen out of twenty-eight EU partners 
represented more than 90% of share in the European automotive market (dominated by 
Germany, with more than a 30% share). In eight of the partner countries, more than 80% 
of automotive exports were destined for European markets. Only Germany and the United 
Kingdom registered higher exports to countries outside the EU, proving that these 
countries have been able to geographically reorient their exports in the face of declining 
European demand in the wake of the crisis. From the supply side, the degree of sectoral 
regionalization is even higher, with ratios above 75% for European imports over total 
sector imports for all EU members.  
Table 1. Main variables of the automotive industry by country 
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Source: Own calculations from Eurostat (SBS database) 
However, changes in the geographical distribution of automotive production have also 
been occurring within Europe with the movement being towards the Eastern European 
countries. Germany is clearly the main producing country, accounting for more than 42% 
of regional sector production and 34% of sector employment. This is distantly followed 
by the traditional European producer countries – France, the United Kingdom, Spain and 
Italy – and then by producer countries in Eastern Europe. Despite the lower share of 
regional production of Eastern European countries, the relative importance of the sector 
within each economy is much higher in terms of their share of production, employment, 
and trade in most cases, underlining the distinct regional nature of production and the 
external exposure of the sector within these countries. It is also worthwhile noticing the 
difference in the regional distribution of the number of enterprises which is more or less 
Table 2. Main
variables of the 
Over	European	
automotive	
sector
Over	national	
manufacturing
Over	
European	
automotive	
sector
Over	national	
manufacturing
Over	
European	
automotive	
sector
Over	national	
manufacturing
Over	
European	
automotive	
sector
Over	national	
manufacturing
Germany 42,3% 18,1% 34,7% 11,3% 38,7% 18,8% 20,3% 9,7%
France 9,6% 9,1% 9,8% 7,6% 6,8% 8,7% 11,1% 9,5%
United Kingdom 9,3% 11,6% 6,4% 6,0% 7,9% 11,0% 14,3% 12,3%
Spain 7,2% 12,5% 5,8% 7,9% 7,9% 18,0% 7,8% 12,9%
Italy 6,1% 5,4% 6,9% 4,3% 5,9% 8,3% 6,9% 8,9%
Czech Rep 4,7% 24,8% 6,3% 12,1% 4,9% 19,8% 2,7% 9,8%
Poland 3,7% 10,8% 7,3% 7,1% 3,3% 10,8% 3,4% 8,3%
Sweden 3,2% 12,9% 2,8% 10,4% 2,6% 11,9% 3,2% 11,6%
Hungary 2,9% 24,9% 3,5% 12,2% 2,4% 15,6% 1,9% 10,4%
Slovakia 2,8% 32,7% 2,6% 13,1% 3,1% 26,8% 2,0% 14,3%
Belgium 2,2% 6,8% 1,5% 7,0% 6,4% 10,4% 8,6% 11,4%
Austria 1,8% 8,2% 1,3% 5,0% 2,0% 8,6% 3,4% 10,1%
Romania 1,6% 18,3% 6,4% 12,7% 1,4% 14,5% 1,2% 8,8%
Netherlands 0,9% 2,3% 0,8% 2,8% 3,3% 3,8% 5,3% 5,3%
Portugal 0,9% 8,5% 1,3% 4,8% 0,9% 10,8% 1,4% 11,4%
Slovenia 0,3% 10,6% 0,6% 6,9% 0,8% 15,6% 0,9% 14,3%
Finland 0,2% 1,4% 0,3% 2,0% 0,5% 5,9% 1,1% 8,8%
Denmark 0,1% 1,0% 0,2% 1,3% 0,4% 2,5% 1,3% 7,9%
Bulgaria 0,1% 3,0% 0,8% 3,3% 0,1% 3,1% 0,4% 7,4%
Ireland 0,1% 0,5% 0,1% 1,8% 0,1% 0,3% 0,7% 5,2%
Estonia 0,0% 2,7% 0,1% 3,2% 0,1% 5,2% 0,3% 8,7%
Lithuania 0,0% 1,3% 0,2% 1,8% 0,1% 3,7% 0,4% 6,9%
Greece 0,0% 0,3% 0,1% 0,7% 0,0% 0,6% 0,4% 3,7%
Croatia 0,0% 1,0% 0,1% 1,0% 0,1% 3,0% 0,2% 6,0%
Latvia 0,0% 1,9% 0,1% 1,4% 0,1% 4,6% 0,2% 7,4%
Cyprus 0,0% 0,3% 0,0% 0,5% 0,0% 2,8% 0,1% 6,9%
Luxembourg 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 5,2% 0,5% 10,1%
Malta 0,0% n.d 0,0% n.d 0,0% 2,1% 0,0% 3,7%
Total UE 28 100% 11,6% 100% 7,8% 100% 12,0% 100% 9,7%
Production Employment Export Import
2014 2014 2015 2015
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similar among the traditional producer countries in Western Europe and reflected in the 
huge concentration in Germany in terms of production, employment, or exports.  
Table 2. Number of total and foreign automotive enterprises by country 
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat (SBS and FATS database) 
Table 3. Number of assembly plants and corporate automotive groups in each 
country, 2014 
 
Over	European	
automotive	
sector
Over	national	
manufacturing
Number of 
enterprises
Production Employment
Germany 13,4% 1,3% 9,5% 15,5% 19,8%
United Kingdom 14,1% 2,2% 6,8% 88,2% 65,2%
France 10,4% 0,9% 9,4% 25,7% 25,9%
Italy 11,9% 0,6% 4,9% 20,3% 22,2%
Poland 6,9% 0,8% 37,9% 89,5% 77,8%
Spain 8,2% 1,0% 10,5% 89,5% 76,3%
Netherlands 3,8% 1,2% 6,1% 76,8% 58,6%
Sweden 5,5% 2,0% 7,5% 61,3% 58,5%
Czech Rep 5,7% 0,7% 19,4% 94,8% 83,1%
Belgium 2,2% 1,2% 6,9% 89,4% 72,8%
Portugal 3,5% 1,0% 7,8% 85,8% 63,5%
Austria 1,6% 1,2% 11,6% 84,5% 68,2%
Hungary 2,5% 1,0% 28,4% 96,4% 86,1%
Romania 2,3% 0,9% 38,6% 95,9% 90,3%
Slovakia 1,4% 0,4% 36,6% 96,2% 90,6%
Finland 1,3% 1,2% 3,1% 42,7% 31,4%
Croatia 0,6% 0,6% 8,7% 78,9% 62,3%
Slovenia 0,9% 0,9% 11,5% 52,5% 36,5%
Bulgaria 0,6% 0,4% 19,1% 85,8% 80,2%
Rest EU countries 3,3%
Total UE 28 100% 0,9%
Number of total entreprises Foreign entreprises
2014 	(%	over	total	automotive	sector,	2013)
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Source: ACEA database 
 
These differences become even clearer if we look at the same variables in terms of 
enterprise ownership. First, traditional producing countries (Germany, the UK, France, 
Italy, and Spain), the Netherlands and Belgium have a low proportion of foreign 
enterprises as part of the total sector, revealing the density of the internal sector make-up. 
However, only in Germany, France, and Italy do these domestic enterprises contribute 
more than foreign forms in terms of production or employment. Unsurprisingly, these 
countries have a high concentration of assembly plants (except the UK which is 
characterised by geographic and production particularities) and host their own national 
groups and brands – Germany’s Volkswagen, France’s PSA and Renault, as well as Italy’s 
FCA. In terms of enterprise groups, Volkswagen has mot production locations in the EU 
with a presence in 14 countries, followed by Opel in six countries (also originally 
Total number  Corporate groups
Germany 41
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	AC,	BINZ	GmbH,	BMW	GROUP,	DAIMLER	AG,	FORD	OF	EUROPE,	IVECO	,	
OPEL	GROUP,	WIESMANN
United Kingdom 33
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	ALEXANDER	DENNIS,	ASHOK	LEYLAND	COMPANY,	ASTON	MARTIN	,	BMW	
GROUP,	CATERHAM,	DAIMLER	AG,	DENNIS	EAGLE,	ENVISAGE	GROUP,	FORD	OF	EUROPE,	GEELY	UK	
LTD,	GINETTA	,	HONDA	,	MCLAREN,	LEYLAND	TRUCKS,	LOTUS	GROUP	,	MORGAN	,	NISSAN	MOTOR	
COMPANY	,	OPEL	GROUP,	SAIC	MOTOR,	TOYOTA	MOTOR	EUROPE,	WRIGHTBUS
France 33
VOLKSWAGEN	AG,	DAIMLER	AG,	IVECO	,	MDI,	PSA	PEUGEOT	CITROËN	,	RENAULT	SA,	TOYOTA	
MOTOR	EUROPE,	VOLVO	GROUP	
Italy 23 VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	BREDAMENARINIBUS	,	BREMACH	,	DR	MOTOR,	FCA,	IVECO	,	PAGANI	,	PIAGGIO	
Poland 15
VOLKSWAGEN	AG,	FCA,	SOLARIS,	OPEL	GROUP,	TOYOTA	MOTOR	EUROPE,	FCA,	VOLVO	GROUP	,	
JELCZ	
Spain 14
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	DAIMLER	AG,	FORD	OF	EUROPE,	IRIZAR,	IVECO	,	NISSAN	MOTOR	COMPANY,
	OPEL	GROUP,	PSA	PEUGEOT	CITROËN	,	RENAULT	SA	
Netherlands 10
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	DAF	TRUCKS	NV	,	VDL	GROUP,	DONKERVOORT	,	TESLA	MOTORS,	GINAF,	SPYKER	
NV
Sweden 9 VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	KOENIGSEGG	AUTOMOTIVE	AB,	VOLVO	GROUP	,	NEVS
Czech Rep 8
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	TPCA	(TOYOTA	MOTOR	CORP	-	PSA),	TEDOM,	TATRA	,	SOR,	IVECO,	HYUNDAI	
MOTOR	EUROPE
Belgium 8
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	VOLVO	CAR	CORPORATION	(GEELY),	VOLVO	GROUP	,	VAN	HOOL,		IMPERIA	
AUTOMOBILES,	VDL	GROUP,	MOL	CY	NV,	DAF	TRUCKS	NV	
Portugal 6
VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	RENAULT	SA	,	PSA	PEUGEOT	CITROËN	,	TOYOTA	MOTOR	EUROPE,	DAIMLER	AG,	
CAETANOBUS
Austria 5 	VOLKSWAGEN	AG,	OPEL	GROUP,	MAGNA	STEYR,	IVECO,	BMW	GROUP
Hungary 4 VOLKSWAGEN	AG,	SUZUKI	,	DAIMLER	AG,	OPEL	GROUP
Romania 3 ROMAN,	RENAULT	SA	,	FORD	OF	EUROPE
Slovakia 3 VOLKSWAGEN	AG	,	PSA	PEUGEOT	CITROËN,	HYUNDAI	MOTOR	GROUP
Finland 2 VALMET	AUTOMOTIVE,	SISU	AUTO
Croatia 2 DOK-ING
Slovenia 1 RENAULT	SA	
Bulgaria 1 LITEX	MOTORS
Total UE 28 221
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German, now a subsidiary of the USA’s GM group), and PSA and Renault in five 
countries. 
The high number of assembly plants in Spain and Poland is also remarkable in addition 
to the low number of assemblers in Hungary or Slovakia while the contribution by foreign 
enterprises to production or employment is high in all these countries. Additionally, the 
automotive sector in these cases is highly important to the manufacturing sector as a 
whole. This may be taken as evidence of hierarchical articulation relations and of the need 
to develop further positional analyses within the automotive industry.  
Network mapping 
Position analysis in the automotive industry following this methodology reveals patterns 
that have remained virtually unchanged over time. Figures 1 and 2 indicate the main 
results following the application of the network mapping methodology to trade in the 
European automotive industry. Here we represent the relations between the main 
European producing countries. 
Figure 1. Dominance and dependency in trade relations in the European Automobile 
Sector, 2013 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
 
It becomes immediately obvious that so-called dominance relations and their opposite 
counterpart, dependency relations, are the most obvious throughout the period with a high 
degree of concentration of production and trade in a small number of countries. German 
dominance is, without doubt, the most remarkable factor and consistent with Germany’s 
relevance as both a producer and consumer country. Germany is the only economy that 
establishes relevant relations with all the other producer countries. At the same time, other 
countries including some of the large producers do not maintain relations with the 
majority of EU member states. For example, in 2013 Italy did not maintain relevant 
relations with thirteen, and Spain with nineteen other member states). Furthermore, 
Germany’s trading relationships are mainly of the dominance-type. This implies that 
Germany is a major buyer in and supplier to each country. At the same time, no 
dependency relationship has emerged for Germany. 
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Figure 2. Integration in trade relations in the European Automobile Sector, 2013 
 
Source: Own calculationes based on Eurostat Comext Database 
 
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are also listed as major economies in this sector, 
although with far fewer relationships of dominance than Germany has. Only France 
increased its number of dominance relationships between 1999 and 2013 while Italy and 
the United Kingdom both reduced the number of such relationships. Moreover, neither 
Spain has managed to establish any dominance relationship over the period (although it 
is among the five main European producers), nor have the emerging producer countries 
in Eastern Europe. In fact, only the Czech Republic showed one dominant relationship in 
2013. 
 
In the case of the Spanish economy, the recent import contraction has reduced the number 
of its trading relationships although it still maintains significant trading relationships with 
France, Italy, and Portugal. Spain maintains its role as a supplier although it has lost its 
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relevance in the regional automotive network. This role is increasingly taken up by 
Eastern Europe producer countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland. This is evident 
from the increasing number of source-dominance (Sd) relationships of these two 
countries while Spain has experienced a reduction of the same types of relationships. 
 
In short, the intense process of fragmentation and relocation of production experienced in 
the last 15 years has changed the positions of some supplier countries in the regional 
European automotive production network, but it has not challenged the German 
dominance of the European automotive sector. As suggested in the previous section, 
different national positions in this network are indicative of the capacity of lead firms to 
decide how and where production and trade occurs. Therefore, these positions are also 
closely related to a nation’s ability for extra-EU export reorientation.  
 
Positional power measurement 
Adapted to the automotive sector positional power measurement (as noted in Section 3) 
complements the previous analysis since it allows the authors to differentiate between 
final goods and parts and components (intermediate goods). In this way, it becomes 
possible to relate the position as a seller of final goods (export competitiveness) with the 
position as a buyer of intermediate goods (the fragmentation of production). Ultimately, 
a higher capacity to organize production fragmentation allows for a greater improvement 
in competitiveness. This may be obvious, but it is also interesting to note the varying 
positions of producer countries as they are being played out against each other.  
 
Figure 3. Producer-driven indicator, considering final goods over total flows 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
The results of the position indicator considering trade in final goods illustrates once again 
the German dominance within the industry. The relative share of German exports of final 
goods over total trade of the sector is much greater than for any other European producer. 
Although the five main producers (Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain) have all 
experienced a certain weakening of their position (most pronounced in the case of 
France), the ranking has not been significantly altered. Germany retains the strongest 
position as a supplier of finished goods despite the emergence of new producer countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. 
Figure 4: Buyer-driven indicator, considering parts and components over total flows 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
The buyer-driven indicator results, calculated only for trade in parts and components 
(intermediate goods), emphasizes the strengthening trend experienced by certain major 
producers (Germany, Spain, and France) and the ascent of new countries. This 
demonstrates the increasing fragmentation and productive mobility in the sector as well 
as the degree of regional interdependence. Although Germany is the country with the 
greatest purchasing power within the network, the gap between the major producer 
countries in Western Europe and Eastern Europe has been reduced in terms of the buyer-
driven indicator. In other words, there is less concentration of power in the existing 
producer-driven terms. 
 
The results show that the growing fragmentation of production has consolidated the 
position of Germany within the network, both as a buyer of intermediate goods and as a 
provider of final goods. In the next section, we will examine whether there is a connection 
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between the positions occupied within the regional network and the projection of exports 
outside the EU. 
 
Geographical and technological export trends in the EU automotive sector 
The aim of this section is to analyse export patterns in the automotive European sector in 
order to assess the importance of demand from outside the EU as a driver of export 
growth. First, we look at the general intra- and extra-EU export trends, distinguishing 
between final goods and intermediate goods (parts and components). Then we proceed 
further with the analysis, distinguishing between the technological contents of these 
exports. Given the difficulty in presenting this analysis for all EU countries, we focus on 
three economies which we considered to be representative of different positions on the 
network: Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic. 
 
General trends in trade flows, intra- and extra-EU  
The geographical reorientation of exports in the automotive sector has been occurring 
while a high level of regionalization of production has been maintained. This is 
manifested in the low weight of imports from outside the EU and in the growth of exports 
with an extra-EU destination. Between 1999 and 2014, exports to non-EU countries 
recorded a simple variation rate of 210%. In 1999, these exports accounted for 22.9% of 
total exports, growing to 36.6% by 2014, particularly since 2009 when they represented 
26.9%13. However, this export reorientation at the aggregate level can be said to feature 
many individual nuances. 
                                                     
13  Extra-EU imports are mainly concentrated in final goods (in 2014, 63% of total imports of 
extra-EU origin) so the fragmentation and integration of production have been maintained at the 
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Figure 5. EU-27 trade in the automotive industry (millions €) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
 
In 2014, thirteen of the fifteen major European producing countries 14 in the automotive 
sector recorded a ratio of intra-EU exports above 60% of total exports – six of them with 
                                                     
regional level, despite the increased volume of extra-regional trade. Imports of EU origin are 
above 77% of total imports in all economies considered, and over 85% in twelve of the fifteen 
nations considered. 
14 Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, 
Portugal, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Aggregated exports from 
these economies represented 97.5% of total exported in 2014 by the European automotive sector. 
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a ratio higher than 80%15, and the top five at 70%16. Only in Germany and the UK were 
the exports with an extra-EU destination higher (at 52% and 55%, respectively). 
Hence, the data show that despite the growth of exports outside of the EU, the European 
Community remains the primary customer for practically all members of the Union. This 
means that the increasing "globalization" of exports conceals very uneven trends and 
qualitatively different export patterns across countries according to their positions in the 
regional network. To further explore these differences and connect them with our findings 
in the previous section, it is necessary to make a sector-wide breakdown of the flows 
between final goods and parts and components. 
 
Thus, we find that over 78% of total sector exports corresponded to finished goods in 
2014. This was similar to the percentage recorded in 2007. In other words, both 
categories, finished goods and parts, registered similar growth rates throughout this 
period – both around 55% considering total EU flows although there were significant 
differences amongst the producer countries. In any case, in the global market, Europe 
fundamentally competes as a supplier of finished goods which is consistent with the 
importance that the regional production networks still carries. At the same time, only 
Germany and the UK recorded a higher sales weight of final goods with non-EU 
                                                     
15 Spain, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, and Portugal.  
16 France, Austria, Netherlands, Slovakia, Romania, Italy, and Sweden are between 60% and 
70%.  
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destinations with ratios above 55% in 2014. All other European partners exported 
primarily to the EU market.17 
 
The sectoral breakdown of flows between parts and components and finished goods 
allows us to interrelate export capacity (competitiveness) and import dynamics, revealing 
an interesting trend connected to that observed in the previous section: those countries 
with the highest increases in total exports of final goods are precisely those with the 
largest increases in imports of parts and components (Figure 6). Furthermore, the results 
show the strengthening of the sector on the European periphery, even as different trends 
emerge between Germany and the UK. Note that the figure shows simple variation rates. 
Hence, it is to be expected that countries with very low export volumes have recorded 
very high rates. 
 
Germany, the largest exporter, does not record higher rates of variation, but it is the 
country with the greatest increase in its share of total EU exports, especially exports with 
a non-EU destination. In other words, the nation’s export leadership has been 
strengthened. Between 2007 and 2014 Germany increased its share over total EU 
automotive exports by 4 points, the UK by 2.7 points, and the Czech Republic by 0.8, 
while most other countries reduced this share18. We find therefore that the 
                                                     
17 In five of the fifteen selected countries –Slovakia, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and the United 
Kingdom– exports of final goods exceeded 70% of sector exports in 2014. In the case of the 
United Kingdom and Belgium, they exceeded 80%. 
18 In Spain and the Czech Republic, the share of extra-EU exports among total exports has 
increased by between 4 to 6 points (in 2008, they represented 15.5% and 11.2% of total exports, 
respectively, and 19.5% and 16.2% in 2014). Germany in the same period recorded an increase 
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competitiveness of exports of finished goods is directly linked to the intensification of 
production fragmentation, allowing the best-positioned countries to make a faster shift 
towards foreign markets. 
Figure 6. Variation of final goods exports and imports of parts and components, 
simple variation rate 2007-2014 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
 
In summary, considering trade flows at the sectorial level, two general trends are 
highlighted. First, regarding the origin and destination of flows, the increase in exports 
                                                     
of 37.8% (to 51%), and it was also the country with the largest share of extra-EU exports (53.3% 
in 2013), while those of Spain and the Czech Republic remained very low (at 4.5% and 2.2%, 
respectively). 
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with non-EU destinations presents a very unequal distribution among countries. Second, 
the breakdown between finished goods and parts shows that the growth of automotive 
exports to non-EU destinations has been especially strong in finished goods, sustained 
amid a growing fragmentation of production. This has mainly been the case for Germany, 
which is best-positioned according to the indicators used in the previous section. 
 
Export pattern analysis 
Following from the previous analysis, we disaggregate the sector further in order to take 
into consideration the different technological contents of exported goods. Given the 
difficulty of presenting this analysis for all countries, we again focus on three economies 
that are representative of the various profiles in the network: Germany, Spain, and the 
Czech Republic. 
 
Within the category of final goods there are different types of vehicles, passenger cars 
being those with the highest weight among the main European producer countries and the 
type to which we refer here. However, there are numerous models within this subcategory 
with important differences in terms of their production and technological complexity such 
as the type of engine used (diesel or gasoline) or in its cubic capacity. 
Table 4. Exports of cars by final good in 2014 and variation since 1999 (% over 
automotive sector)  
 
 
Germany Spain Czech Rep. 
  Intra Extra Intra Extra Intra Extra 
Gasoline 2014 
1999-
2014 2014 
1999-
2014 2014 
1999-
2014 2014 
1999-
2014 2014 
1999-
2014 2014 
1999-
2014 
< 1,000cc 1.0% 0.7 0.1% 0.1 1.5% -3.6 0.2% -0.1 5.2% 5.2 0.1% 0.1 
1,000 cc - 1,500 cc 2.5% -0.1 1.5% 1.3 11.7% -6.4 2.4% 1.0 12.1% 1.9 1.9% 0.8 
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1,500 cc - 3,000 cc 3.0% -15.1 18.8% 4.3 8.7% -7.3 3.1% 1.0 3.8% -13.7 5.1% 2.6 
> 3,000 cc 1.1% -1.1 7.7% -0.8 0.1% 0.0 0.2% 0.2 0.3% 0.3 0.0% 0.0 
Diesel                         
< 1,500 cc 0.8% 0.7 0.1% 0.1 5.8% 5.3 1.2% 1.2 0.8% 0.8 0.0% 0.0 
1,500 cc - 2,500 cc 14.9% 1.1 3.9% 3.2 21.8% 4.2 2.8% 2.1 20.5% 0.3 3.6% 2.5 
> 2.500cc 3.6% 2.1 1.8% 1.5 0.6% -1.1 0.1% -0.1 0.2% 0.2 0.1% 0.1 
TOTAL 26.8% -11.6 33.9% 9.8 50.2% -8.9 10.1% 5.3 43.0% -5.1 10.9% 6.2 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
 
The first highlight of the above table is the weight of exports of mid-range vehicles (of 
both 1,000 to 3,000 cc gasoline engines, and of diesel engines between 1,500 and 2,500 
cc) in the three economies. However, while exports of diesel vehicles are mainly 
concentrated within the EU, exports outside the Union are concentrated in gasoline 
vehicles, especially in the segment between 1,500 and 3,000 cc, where the Germans 
dominate and in higher capacity vehicles, meaning gasoline engine over 3,000 cc and 
diesel engines over 2,500 cc. In fact, exports of vehicles outside the EU with a capacity 
between 1,500 and 3,000 cc constituted the largest category of German exports in 2014. 
Comparing these data with those recorded in 1999, the crisis has mainly impacted on 
intra-EU exports, especially of gasoline vehicles19. This decrease has been compensated 
in the case of Germany by extra-EU exports, mainly by mid-range vehicles. Meanwhile, 
Spain has strengthened its expertise in diesel vehicles destined for EU markets. Czech 
growth has been more in low-end gasoline vehicles. These were also destined for EU 
markets – a segment where Spain has lost ground, thus confirming the regional production 
reconfiguration process. Hence, while Germany is strengthening its expertise in exports 
                                                     
19 However, the effect of the crisis on European demand is added to the previous growth trend of 
diesel vehicles. 
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outside the EU, Spain and the Czech Republic are mainly specializing in mid- and lower 
range vehicles for the internal EU market. 
It should be noted that the decline in relative importance of exports in both Germany and 
Spain to the European Community market is higher than the increase recorded in extra-
EU exports. This implies that the importance of parts and components exports in the 
sector structure has increased in these countries. However, within the category of parts 
and components, there are also several distinct kinds of goods in terms of production and 
technological complexity, each of which transfer different values to final goods, and 
which result in different export patterns and import dependencies. Pavlinek, Domansky 
and Guzik (2009) propose a classification of parts and components in the automotive 
sector in terms of value added to the final product. First, those with low added value are 
mainly composed of body and parts, wires, bumpers, mufflers, exhaust pipes, and wheels. 
Those with high added value are engines, transmission systems, and steering and brake 
systems. The remaining assets would fall into a category of medium value20. 
Table 5. Exports of parts and components of motor vehicles (except those of 
motorcycles) by value added (intra-UE and extra-UE) in 2014 and variation since 
1999 (% over total automotive sector) 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat Comex Database 
 
                                                     
20 For the identification of these products, we have used classifications of the Harmonized System 
8 digit (HS8) offered by Comext (Eurostat). 
2014 1999-2014 2014 1999-2014 2014 1999-2014 2014 1999-2014 2014 1999-2014 2014 1999-2014
High 5,6% 1,0 5,7% 4,2 3,5% -0,4 0,9% 0,8 9,4% 1,6 1,9% 1,4
Medium 1,9% 0,2 1,2% 0,6 4,4% 0,0 1,0% 0,8 9,1% 4,2 1,0% 0,7
Low 3,1% -0,4 2,9% 1,8 2,5% 0,0 0,8% 0,7 13,2% -2,2 1,5% 1,2
TOTAL 10,5% 0,9 9,8% 6,7 10,4% -0,5 2,8% 2,4 31,7% 3,6 4,4% 3,4
Extra
Germany Spain Czech Rep.
Intra Extra Intra Extra Intra
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Analysing only parts and components exports we detected trends similar to those already 
shown in the segment on final goods. Germany achieved significant growth in products 
of higher value and in non-EU orientation. In 2014, Spanish and Czech exports of parts 
and components with destinations outside the EU were insignificant, while in Germany 
they reached a ratio similar to that of exports destined for the EU with higher value added 
parts playing a more active role. Since 1999, the growth in higher value added parts 
(again, engines, transmission systems, and steering and brake systems) has been  more 
than 4 percentage points (above the total exported by the sector) in the case of Germany, 
compared to 1.4 points for the Czech Republic and 0.8 for Spain. 
Discussion 
The above analysis offers new elements to the discussion on network positioning in 
GPNs. We find that indicators based on trade flows allow for an initial empirical approach 
to the analysis of inter-firm power relations within production networks. This also proves 
to be a suitable operational methodology for adopting a national perspective, as 
demonstrated in our study, given the interest in linking the position of a national industry 
to questions of sector competitiveness. Analysis of trade trends gains importance as 
international production fragmentation grows, and as outsourcing or offshoring of 
activities become widespread. Variables that were once exclusive aspects of the 
production dimension now extend to the trade dimension. In other words, as production 
fragmentation grows, production is atomised, causing trade among different units to 
become integrated. In a similar fashion, control methods and the position of one country 
over another go beyond traditional control mechanisms of ownership through foreign 
direct investment, increasing the importance of other non-equity forms that may be 
manifested in the destination, origin, and relative volume of the trade relationships. This 
methodology can be complemented with other applications at the firm level, through case 
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studies that allow for more specific information on property relations and control of the 
processes of technological innovation. Both these issues are fundamental to 
understanding the relationships of intra-network power. 
 
Although use of the buyer-driven indicator for the parts and components subsector and of 
the producer-driven indicator for final goods represents a slight deviation from the 
methodology proposed by Mahutga, it allows us to better capture the relationship between 
the process of production fragmentation (found mainly in booming trade in parts and 
components) and competitiveness in final goods. Thus, the use of these indicators 
contributes to assessing which countries have benefited most from international 
production fragmentation in terms of improving their competitiveness in final goods. This 
information is complementary to the methodology provided by Piana who notes the 
importance of geographical concentration of trade as a source of evidence proving the 
existence of relations of production integration, domination, or dependence.  
 
Conclusion 
The study of the patterns of international integration in the automotive industry requires 
a focus on both global and regional production networks in order to understand the 
specialization patterns and assess to relative positions of producer countries within the 
European automotive network. The analysis developed in this article confirms a general 
conclusion: the best-positioned country in the EU regional network has increased its 
exports outside the EU especially since the 2008 crisis. By contrast, more subordinate 
countries continue to be heavily dependent on the regional market. Therefore, we can 
confirm that the scope of a strategy for diversification of exports outside the EU is deeply 
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influenced by the position of a given national industry within the regional network 
(which, as we have seen, exhibits profound inequalities). 
 
It is also possible to draw two conclusions about the link between the position and 
reconfiguration of exports by the type of goods exported. First, the growth of automotive 
exports with destinations outside the EU has been fuelled by fragmentation, and by 
regional production integration, particularly in the case of Germany. That is, the German 
automotive industry increased its exports of mainly final goods outside the EU by 
increasing its imports of parts and components which tended to be of EU origin. Second, 
the technological-content analysis performed for three representative economies 
(Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic) showed marked differences in export 
specialization patterns, combined with higher or lower levels of regional demand 
dependence and with different patterns of technological specialization.  
 
In other words, while diesel vehicle exports are mainly concentrated within the European 
Community market, exports outside the Union are concentrated in mid-range gasoline 
vehicles (especially German) as well as those on the highest range. Spain has strengthened 
its expertise in diesel vehicles destined for EU markets while the Czech Republic has 
advanced its position in low range gasoline vehicles. In the parts and components 
subsector, Germany again achieved significant growth in products with higher added 
value and of extra-EU orientation. 
 
Finally, these findings reopen the debate on the determinants of competitiveness. As has 
already been pointed out by several authors, an increase in exports depends largely on the 
dynamism of the trading partners. This dynamism has recently increased through extra-
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EU demand, benefiting those with greater outreach to external markets. However, 
outward projection is not entirely independent of regional organization of production; 
indeed, quite the opposite is true, making the position in the chain a key determinant of 
the export potential for each national industry. 
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ANNEX 
 
Table A1. Trade Network Relations 
Name  
Binary 
description  
Abbreviation Qualitative description  
Absence of relationships  0000 NR The countries "ignore" each other  
Source dependence  0001 Sdp B is an important provider for A  
Destination dependence  0010 Ddp B is an important market for A  
Dependence  0011 Dp 
B is very important to A, but the reverse is 
not true  
Source dominance  0100 Sd 
A is an important provider for B, but A can 
ignore B  
Source integration  0101 Si They both need each other as providers  
Mono out-integration  0110 Moi 
One flow is important for both: the exports 
of A to B  
Dependent source 
interconnection  
0111 Dpsi 
A depends on B, but B needs A only as a 
source of supply  
Destination dominance  1000 Dd 
A is an important destination for B, while 
A can ignore B  
Mono in-integration  1001 Mii 
One flow is important for both: the exports 
from B to A  
Destination integration  1010 Di They both need each other as exporters  
Dependent destination 
interconnection  
1011 Dpdi 
A depends on B, but B needs A only as a 
destination  
Dominance  1100 D 
A is very important to B and can afford to 
ignore it  
Dominant source 
interconnection  
1101 Dsi 
A is very important to B but A needs B 
only as a source  
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Dominant destination 
interconnection  
1110 Ddi 
A is very important to B, but A needs B 
only as a destination  
Integration  1111 I They need each other on equal footing 
 
Source: Piana (2006) 
Producer-driven indicator 
   
where Xji are exports from country j to country i, and Yi is total imports from country i. 
 
Buyer-driven indicator 
   
where Yij are imports to country j from country i, and Xi is total exports of country i.  
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